Post-Conflict DDR in BiH: First Generation Solutions for Third Generation Challenges

By: Kaitlyn Lynes of The New School

With the end of the Balkans War in 1995 by outside military intervention, the international community quickly stepped in to implement a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Although the UN had an earlier presence in the region, declaring “safe areas” under international protection since 1993, its mandate did not include the use of force, and therefore was quickly overrun by the Serb military. This ultimately led to the 1995 genocide in Srebrenica.

When the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed in December 1995, provisions for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) were exclusively based on a statebuilding and security-centric framework—what we now consider the first generation of DDR. There was no long-term perspective for the program, due to the political fragility of the DPA and the final goal being the immediate conclusion of violence. The peacekeeping mission in BiH was further defined by first generation DDR through its overt preference for political rather than development processes and embodiment of the post-Cold War era with international cooperation.

Primary responsibility for the implementation of DDR officially fell to the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), but in reality became a disjointed effort on behalf of the international community. Because there had been no prior Bosnian state before the war, institution-building was ignored in the short term, and an international transitional governance body was established that could not ultimately take responsibility or accountability for long term reintegration objectives. With approximately 400,000 to 430,000 combatants requiring DDR, the DPA simply called for the demobilization and disarmament of armed fighters, reducing their risk as spoilers and consolidating power into a governance structure. After disarmament, no further assistance to ex-combatants was provided.

The first generation statebuilding objectives could also not account for the communal nature of the conflict. As the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) states, “such ‘communal conflicts’ are generally long-lived, difficult to solve and represent great challenges with regard to establishing mutual trust: trust that is a necessary precondition for weapons collection.” Because the conflict necessitated the dissolution of Yugoslavia, there was no state for Bosniaks to return to or trust. If citizens could not trust the state to provide protection from the Serbs, there was no incentive to participate in a DDR program.

While second generation DDR objectives, focusing on development and reintegration, could have positively impacted Bosnia’s ability to support ex-combatants and enforce peace, third generation DDR programming better addresses many of the challenges Bosnia faces today. In order to achieve a total and lasting peace, there must be trust and transparency in statebuilding and institution-building initiatives, acknowledgement of shortcomings in the reconciliation process for victims, and the crucial role identity has played in the conflict. The international community must turn over ownership of the entire peace process to the Bosnian state, and a new political and legal framework must replace the outdated, first generation-driven DPA.


Moratti, Massimo, and Amra Sabic-El-Rayess. “Transitional Justice and DDR: the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” International Center for Transitional Justice (2009): 6.

Pietz, Tobias. Demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina: an assessment of external assistance. Hamburg: Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik, 2004.

Rufer, Reto. “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR): Conceptual approaches, specific settings, practical experiences.” Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper. http://se2. dcaf. ch/serviceengine/FileContent (2005).

Moving beyond Peace keeping – Second Generation DDR and the case of Haiti

By Senani Dehigolla of The New School

“UN peacekeeping operations are now increasingly complex and multi-dimensional, going beyond monitoring a ceasefire to actually bringing failed States back to life, often after decades of conflict. The blue helmets and their civilian colleagues work together to organize elections, enact police and judicial reform, promote and protect human rights, conduct mine-clearance, advance gender equality, achieve the voluntary disarmament of former combatants, and support the return of refugees and displaced people to their homes.” ~Kofi Annan

Increased number of conflicts around the world while making the world more insecure demands drastic and effective methods in countering insurgency and to transform nations into peaceful and liveable environments. Authoritarian regimes, religious extremism, barbaric violence, secular nationalism, refugee crisis etc. around the world emphasises the increasingly complex reality of DDR operations that requires dynamic models to operate. It is noteworthy that DDR practises around the world has progressed over last few decades encompassing many political, military, security, humanitarian and socio economic dimensions depending on the diverse nature of conflicts.

Second generation DDR in particular, could be tremendously valuable in moving beyond the military structures towards the entity of community which is severely hindered by armed violence. It is quite obvious that the community play a significant role in successful DDR as it becomes substantial ground for further violence or lasting peace. Therefore, moving beyond traditional DDR is crucial to successful Disarmament and Reintegration given the fragile post conflict contexts where everything that is humane is lost. Many states around the world which were ultimately reduced to ‘failed states’ through conflicts inherits weak public institutions particularly those pertaining to law and justice, constant struggle for power ,illicit drugs, HIV/ AIDS , economic insecurity, lack of political will and pervasive poverty making positive change through DDR an extremely  challenging task. Thus, the evolution of DDR has progressed from a security tool towards a peace building tool in achieving development and improving livelihoods of the affected which in return intensifies its scope and responsibility.

With many dedicated and selfless contributions made every day to make DDR achieve its goals, it is also prone to heavy criticism ranging from failed DDR to outrageous behaviour of ‘blue helmets’. Considering the much debated case of Haiti, it is clear that unique methods need to be implemented to address the changing dynamics of conflicts arising from different contexts. Detached relations of New York and Geneva from the actual intensity of ground realities, financial issues, and poor identification of issues on the ground are some of the negative aspects pertaining to the case of Haiti. MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) was widely criticised for its limited response to the root causes of the conflict where social and political aspects were largely ignored. Since 1991 a number of UN missions have intervened in Haiti and by 2004 the situation was much worse. However, with constant harassments from natural disasters Haiti was in the brink of destruction and admirably the UN support was still available to them. Thus, UNDP’s more innovative approach to DDR in restoring daily life help build the social fabric of these communities with individuals gaining employment, self-respect and creating space for change. Furthermore, to increase its positive impact, DDR programs require better training for the blue helmets, inter cultural dialogue and dedicating longer period of time in conflict affected areas. Long term stabilization also depends on optimistic government participation and increased national capacity to manage weapons and to curb violence.

Colombia, Peace, Social & Political Absorption Capacity

By:  Lina Castellanos – The New School

Reintegration and Absorption Capacity

Last Sunday, October the 2nd, Colombians were asked to vote Yes or No in a national plebiscite to approve –or not- the Government’s peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). After 52 years of war, the bewildering outcome was No. All of a sudden, the four year negotiations between the Government and the leaders of the FARC in Havana-Cuba, were reduced to No 50,21% (6.431.376 votes) and Yes 49,78% (6.377.482 votes). Even more shocking than the rejection of the peace agreement, was the number of Colombians that didn’t vote (around 62% of Colombians didn’t participate in the plebiscite). The outcome to some was absolutely appalling but at the end demonstrates -within a long list of other conclusions- that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration -DDR- processes are certainly highly unpredictable and need to constantly evolve. Moreover, it demonstrates that the concept of Absorption Capacity was definitely a serious setback in the recent Colombian events.

Absorption capacity is the ability of a community, economy and/or country to include ex-combatants as active full members of the society. The term can also refer to social and political reintegration opportunities. In the 297 pages of the peace accord document -for example- FARC were given the opportunity to become a political party and were given relatively small punishments for their crimes. Those two elements –again, in conjunction with many others from different natures- are precisely a clear sign of the challenges Reintegration and Absorption Capacity represent. Political reintegration was for sure one of the main issues Colombians who voted were evidently divided. Those who believed this was an historic opportunity to end a long-lasting war voted Yes, and those who didn’t agree with the content of the accord, and specially with the benefits given to the FARC, voted No. In that sense, there is a relevant percentage of Colombian population who may be an obstacle when trying to undertake reintegration initiatives and who would at some extent threaten the DDR process, specially the absorption and reintegration of FARC members.

Armed conflict destroys the social fabric of a country; it is clear that for those who personally suffer the consequences of war forgiving is a major thing. Yet, not everyone who voted No has experienced the conflict and many of the regions directly affected by the conflict voted Yes; this proves the myriad of personal experiences that can highly influence a peace process. In the Colombian case, there was an agreement between the Government and the guerrilla group, however we can’t forget that the basis of reintegration is a result of sustainable, community-driven efforts. Efforts hard to achieve when a peace process is tremendously politicized.

Political Reintegration & Governance Issues in Myanmar – An editorial response

In her article for PRSG “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Myanmar”, Helena Gronberg from the New School’s Graduate Program of International Affairs rightly points us to assessing the role the military will play in the political process. As the article concerns itself with ‘DDR’ specifically, as policy experts and practitioners we do well to note that a military junta, such as that in Myanmar, willingness to engage in political dialogue in and of itself sends a strong signal that a peace process may be ripe. To this end we can also examine Helena’s previous question in PRSG, “Is The Time Ripe for DDR in Myanmar?”

These are incredibly important, yet distinctly separate questions. To the first point we may acknowledge the military engagement in a process that even considers DDR as a step forward in the wider domain of peace processes. The reluctance of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to undertake a comprehensive DDR is less telling, than it is expected. In the second instance we take note that conditions optimal for DDR to be credibly planned and executed are not firmly in place. To this end we may fathom the answer – No! The time is not ripe for DDR, though perhaps the more poignant question is whether DDR is the appropriate vehicle in its traditional configuration to forward the peace process and reshape the wider security sector environment. Conventional wisdom leads us the conclude DDR is not optimal, rather may be pasted upon the Myanmar context due to a lack of preconditions being existent.

In dispelling the use of DDR as an umbrella initiative to affect security elements of complex peace processes, Helena rightly points out the larger, and more nuanced components of an SSR agenda – police, the judiciary and community driven security functions. However, the unpacking of SSR as applied to Myanmar, and when juxtaposed onto DDR, does not go far enough. The situation in Myanmar is what may be aptly termed ‘political reintegration’. This may include wider issues of Governance, autonomy and rule of law (RoL). Termed ‘The Governance of DDR’, preliminary policy research by the UN was scuttled during a 2014 restructuring exercise.

So, if the time is not ripe for DDR, yet DDR ‘like’ processes are underway, where can policy makers and practitioners turn for illustrations and insights. Interestingly, Kosovo provides a model for consideration. The Civil Protection Corps, a Serbian hardline group under the command and control of Belgrade, though resident in Kosovo being considered to perform security sector functions akin to protection of national monuments and heritage sites. This dilutes the armed component of a formal DDR while preserving a security sector function. This is outlined specifically in Article 18 of the Brussels Agreement, which essentially calls for a DDR of the CPC. The purpose as related to ‘political reintegration’ or ‘political DDR’ is to move Kosovo and Serbia close to EU Accession. In this regard, DDR is framed within the ‘normalization or relations’ between Serbia and Kosovo.

Looking closer to home, and good regional illustration from Asia may include a look at the Bangsamoro Framework Agreement that initially outlined a framework for peace between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In this framework agreement political reintegration and cultural reintegration are considered due to that variety and variance in ethnic, religious and cultural makeup. Autonomous economic, educational and security structures are considered as part of a peace process. Where the nomenclature of ‘DDR’ was poorly received by NSAGs, and disarmament even more so, the use of terms such as ‘decommissioning’ seems more palatable and provide more flexibility to design and implementation.

Notions, concepts and prescripts for DDR and SSR are always context specific. Where some elements may not be applicable, or ripe, there are aspects of these programing options that have considerable and direct utility. At the same time, a blanket approach to using DDR runs the risk of program failure at best, and collapse of a peace process and return to conflict at worst. For the victor in a Liberations Struggle DDR may be a heroes option, for a armed rebel groups seeking agency and redress for grievance DDR may be a dubious effort and war by political means, and for a defeated group, DDR may represent humiliation.

The applications of our tools and policies, their context and timing are as important as how they are perceived and the language we use to convey their intent and meaning.

By Dean Piedmont – Director of the CVE & Reintegration Initiative


Prospects for Peace & Security in Myanmar

Helena Gronberg in her piece for PRSG – “Is Myanmar Ripe for DDR?”, rightly points to a classic DDR ‘dilemma’ being faced in Myanmar. This is focused largely on the sequencing of a DDR effort, pointedly D-D-then-R. In what is called ‘classic’ or 1st Generation DDR lasting from around the late 1980s until the early 2000s[1] this was less of an issue as DDRs were governed by comprehensive peace settlements. These occurred most notably in Southern Africa and Central America. Countries like Angola, Mozambique, Guatemala and Nicaragua are notable examples. In the mid-2000s both the promulgation of the global policy guidance known as the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), as well as the 2nd Generation DDR in Peace Operations simultaneously, and respectively, cemented policy around historic best practices and lessons learned while also calling for a new policy construct based on lessons being learned. Part of this new policy call includes flexible sequencing for D-D-R.

While security sector reform (SSR) and/or security sector integration (SSI) is in play when discussing Myanmar, on the face of it this un-necessarily conflates issues related to a negotiated political settlement, and while more complex issues are at stake, the basis of Helena’s argument is one of DDR sequencing and political dialogue. As such, there is nothing inherent to SSR or DDR that requires disarmament prior to negotiating terms in a political settlement.

At issue is the fact that 7 of the 15 armed groups is not parties to the NCA as pointed out. The reasons for such exclusion, willful or otherwise, are as important to understanding the terms for SSR and DDR, as they are for the preconditions to undertake SSR and DDR. Are the conditions that are being established precluding bringing parties to the table? The question is relevant for armed groups, as well as government actors. Disarmament as a precondition for negotiating peace is quite dissimilar to sequencing D-D-R once a settlement is signed. Both require varying degrees to trust in the peace process, and both requires a certain type of entry points for negotiation assuming both parties are willing to do so. This can include incremental disarmament, arms management and verification programs and the like as part of a peace settlement. Disarming armed groups prior to getting them to the peace table is likely to be more difficult.

The above discounts armed group’s unwillingness to be included in any SSR/SSI process that would use DDR as a tool for implementation. As Helena points out, Myanmar’s conflict includes ‘root causes’ and ‘grievances’ related to deep ethnic divisions. In such cases, the very notion of a DDR effort must be challenged – “Is Myanmar Ripe for DDR?” is a suitable question.

The question then becomes is DDR the appropriate tool, program, policy and/or approach for durable conflict mediation and peacebuilding in Myanmar. If issues of autonomy are being pursued as part of a larger SSR, Rule of Law (RoL) and Governance agenda, then we must consider that references and pushes on the DDR issue too early in the peace process may ‘cause harm’ by stalling already fragile peace processes.

In this regard, Myanmar may wish to look to its neighbors both regionally and beyond for examples of ‘DDR-like’ processes that are facilitating peace through approaches that include armed group ‘decommissioning’ as was considered for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, or the ‘normalization of relations’ as is being considered in the Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and the Serbian Civil Protection Corps (CPC). These convey a certain degree of dignity, recognition, respect and legitimacy on armed groups where DDR is often perceived by groups undergoing disarmament as the equivalent to defeat, loss and failure. In some cases this may include cultural, political and personal emasculation.

In all instances, Helena does point us in a direction that is relevant and warrants further analysis and consideration.

By:   Dean Piedmont.  Director PRSG & the Countering Violent Extremism Initiative

[1] The use of the term ‘classic’ or 1st Generation DDR is used by Adjunct Professor Dean Piedmont in at the Studley Graduate Program of International Affairs at the New School in the ‘DDR in Contemporary Peace Operations’ course. The conceptual framework juxtaposes DDR through 3 successive generations. The first deals with a ‘Statebuiding Era’ for DDR, the second is DDR in an ‘Age of Development’ while the third in ‘Political DDR’ typified by ongoing conflict in asymmetric settings with violent extremist (VE) groups. Currently DDR is in its 3rd Generation, though this is not where Myanmar sits in this construct.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Myanmar

By Helena Gronberg


Since the signing of the nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) between the government of Myanmar and eight of the 15 rebel groups active in the country (in October), the question on everyone’s mind is, “what next?” The main question begging for an answer is what role the military will have in the upcoming political dialogue. Other uncertainties include the competition for power among alternative political forces inside the country, the extent of participation in the political dialogue/ peace process by the country’s population at large, including women, and how the recent ceasefire agreements between the government and the various ethnic insurgent groups will play out.

It is widely understood that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is an important process on the road from active military engagement to post-conflict settlement. But in Myanmar, a country where non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have long looked at DDR with great suspicion, putting forth a comprehensive DDR program will not be an easy task. Furthermore, NSAGs frequently prefer to focus not on disarmament, rather other issues, like social and economic reintegration of armed combatants – what they perceive as the grievances, or ‘root causes’ for their taking up arms in the first place.

As Security Sector Reform (SSR) has wider implications than DDR – in that it includes a range of reforms such as judiciary- and police reforms – DDR could be used as a tool for a broader SSR that might also be more attractive to the armed ethnic groups that are so suspicious of DDR efforts. DDR and SSR could thus be mutually reinforcing. Indeed, Knight (2009) argues that military integration in some post-war contexts can be integrated with SSR, including in the police and the judiciary. Furthermore, according to research undertaken in Myanmar (Kyed and Gravers 2014) this might well be an option there as well. Some NSAGs have indicated that they could envisage themselves in a reformed Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces).

According to the UN, SSR in a country in transitional like Myanmar can be aimed at introducing “the principles of democratic governance to the security sector.” The objective is to create public trust in security institutions. It thus seems imperative to include NSAGs in any SSR process. The link between DDR and SSR relates to rightsizing security bodies in the context of post-settlement restructuring. Security personnel who may be downsized as part of this process are likely to require reinsertion and reintegration support.

Kyed and Gravers (2014) suggest that community policing as an integration mechanism for ex-combatants could be considered as part of a wider SSR process that could include members of NSAGs as well as government militias. Such initiatives should be based on proper understanding of existing village defense forces, government militias and NSAG security providers, and the power dynamics that they are embedded in (Kyed and Gravers 2014).

But Myanmar faces many challenges to achieving this. The decades of military rule are still very visible as the military continues to hold on to power and call the shots. Any DDR and SSR will need to be integral parts of the political dialogue.


Knight, M. (2009). Security Sector Reform: Post-Conflict Integration, GFN-SSR. University of Birmingham.

Kyed, H. M and M. Gravers. (2014). Non-State Armed Groups in the Myanmar Peace Process: What are the Future Options? DIIS Working Paper. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies

Is the time ripe for DDR in Myanmar?

In late 2015 a nationwide ceasefire agreement (NCA) was signed between the government of Myanmar and eight of the 15 rebel groups active in the country. Although seven armed groups (including the largest insurgent forces) refused to sign the NCA, the ceasefire was a welcomed step in the current peace process. The process was launched by the civilian government that came to power in 2011 following decades of military rule, and is the first, since 1963, to invite all armed groups to participate.

The history of armed conflict in Myanmar is complex at best and will not be discussed at length here. Suffice it to say that the conflict dates back to colonial rule when the British divided the country according to ethnicity. Efforts of unification were abruptly halted when Aung San, a leader of the Burman ethnic group (father of Aung San Suu Kyi), who had led the country to independence, was assassinated, and the military government came into power. Many ethnic groups ended up taking up arms and demanding autonomy. Conflicts over vast natural resources have also contributed to continued disputes.

The NCA signed in October includes a political roadmap that outlines the next steps of the peace process, including the convening of a political dialogue. It is indeed quite unlikely that any ethnic armed groups would have signed a ceasefire agreement if the government did not assure them of political discussions in the future. Hence, the political dialogue remains decisive for achieving a negotiated settlement and resolving the protracted ethnic conflict and root causes thereof, and thus for the future of the country. There are however multiple outstanding issues in the NCA, which may prove to be stumbling blocks for upcoming negotiations. The question of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is one such issue.

DDR has for long been a contested topic in Myanmar, and has even been argued to be a “non-negotiable”. During talks between the government and armed ethnic groups, the government has maintained that military integration would mean disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, while armed groups (who are willing to consider DDR), have advocated for a more holistic approach that would encompass security sector reform (SSR). Some armed groups have however expressed unwillingness to accept any kind of “reintegration” with the military (the Tatmadaw), and are highly suspicious of any such efforts. This is not unfounded, seeing that history has demonstrated that giving up weapons without a comprehensive political settlement is likely to lead to significant grievances. In the 1950s, plans for armed groups to exchange “weapons with democracy” ended in failure.[1] For other groups like the powerful Karen National Union (KNU), “never to surrender weapons” is one of the most important rules of the group. This naturally makes any negotiation on DDR challenging. But some kind of DDR is necessary for the peace process to succeed, and in this regard a discussion on DDR will need to be included in the political dialogue that is scheduled to follow the signing of the NCA. Disarming the armed groups and reintegrating the former fighters into civilian life is crucial for nation-wide security and stability. But without clear DDR objectives, transparent negotiations and a clear implementation plan, Myanmar risks spiraling back into conflict.

As SSR has wider implications than DDR – in that it includes a range of reforms such as judiciary- and police reforms – DDR could be used as a tool for a broader SSR that might also be more attractive to the armed ethnic groups that are suspicious of DDR efforts. Stay tuned for another blog on this particular topic and other alternative DDR options for Myanmar!

By Helena Gronberg


Demilitarization in Kosovo: A story of “success”


The DDR in Kosovo was incorporated within the peace-agreements that ended the war of former Yugoslav Army against ethnic Albanians in June 1999. Typical for 1st Generation, the DDR programs were used as strategies for creating the new political institutions and security structures that led Kosovo to independence in 2008.

In fact it was Kumanova Agreement signed between NATO and the Yugoslav Army in June 1999 that sought to address the problem of demilitarization and reintegration of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) combatants in order to reduce the short-term threats to internal security and to guarantee the security of international personnel. This agreement was incorporated into the Security Council Resolution 1244 that explicitly called for “the demilitarization and demobilization of the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups.” (Articles 9.b & 15) An additional document titled “Undertaking for Demilitarization and Transformation by KLA”, signed by NATO and KLA commanders set a timeframe–three months within which the demilitarization and demobilization was to be achieved (Article 23(h).

Initially, between 8,000 -10,000, and later on – 25,723 registered combatants were demobilized (Barakat & Ozerdem, 2005:30), and almost 10,000 small arms were surrendered. Yet, 5.5 million rounds of ammunition and several hundred mortars, machine guns and anti-tank weapons, as ICG reported in 1999, remained hidden. As the process of DD ended, a new military force was to be formed, as the former KLA leaders insisted in a “due course, as part of a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.” KLA must be the cellule of future Kosovo army (The Guardian, September 1999). Thus, in 2000, KLA was transformed into Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)–a civilian emergency organization for rapid disaster in times of emergency and humanitarian assistance (Kosovo Constitutional Framework).

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR (De Lellio, 2005) entrusted the selection, recruitment and training of the KPC to the International Organization of Migration (IOM). As agreed, the ex- combatants were given a preferential access in KPC and Kosovo Police Service (KPS) meaning that they were inevitably a “specific beneficiary group.” (Barakat&Ozerdem, 2005; 32) Out of 5,000 KPC members, between 60-65 percent were former KLA combatants, and about 25 percent out of 7000 Kosovo Police officers were former KLA members (Janssens, 2015;138). Meanwhile, the high-level commanders became part of the new temporary institutions.

The process of reintegration was considered as quite successful since it was inclusive, and as such, IOM avoided the creation of marginal and disgruntled groups (De Lellio, 2005). The caseloads operated under a unified command and control–male combatants formed the majority, only 3 percent was female. 16,229 persons were expected to require social and economic reintegration support; in addition, 90 percent of the KPC’s members were selected and trained in order to respond to disasters affecting the population of Kosovo. In total, 61 percent of the registered caseload, have received and are receiving long-term reintegration assistance in one form or another from IOM (Barakat& Ozerdem, 2005;30).

The DDR in Kosovo was unique, because it did not undergo the stages of Security Sector Reform (SSR) but the process was focused on the Security Sector Building (Qehaja& Kosumi), and it is considered as successful to be considered in other situations (De Lellio, 2005). However, there have been critiques about the involvement of majority of ex- combatants in the new structures, as a result of which a large portion remained united and under the same leadership (del Castillo, 2008; 154); the majority of commanding staff were KLA fighters within the same geographic area which made KPC inefficient and non-professional; and the problem with the integration of minorities (Qehaja&Kosumi). As del Castillo says, the productive reintegration of former combatants in fact did not take place, since UN did not insist to reintegrate them in productive activities–in private sector, as it did in El Salvador and Mozambique (del Castillo, 2008;154).

And lastly–the verification process of war veterans, incepted 15 years after the war went through several irregularities, such as including those who were not members of KLA. The verification process has just closed: out of 66,300 applicants, 55,637 are recognized as contributors to the war. The beneficiary groups include: 26,274 recognized war veterans, 8,687 persons with the recognized status of member of KLA (Infocus). Other beneficiary groups, as the Law for Veterans states, include dependents, persons with disabilities, and martyrs. The monthly salary varies between 130-170 euros.

Another dilemma in Kosovo case is regarding the high rank commanders who are under investigations to have committed crimes against humanity, but they now are recognized as war veterans therefore eligible for benefits? The same leaders have been involved in organized crime and corruption – there is a situation when once heroes, now they are treated as criminals.

Sebahate J. Shala