Strong Contribution of The “Weaker Sex” in DDR

By: Senani Dehigolla

The role of women in war and peace while being subjected to heated debates around the world also emphasises the significance that needs to be attributed to them as an integral part of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. Being a major target of combatants women are undoubtedly the most affected during conflict or in circumstances of war owing to their physical vulnerability. Paradoxically, some instances of modern day war fare prove that the integration of women in to military either as combatants or as strategic approaches triggers the need of reconceptualising the requirement of the so called “weaker sex” in DDR. When Yazidi women’s armed struggle against ISIS takes the centre stage, going back in the historical time line it is possible to trace the active participation of extraordinary women such as Joan of Arc, Rani Lakshmi Bhai of Jansi against British India, the French women against the Nazis etc. who were in the limelight for their capacity for military prowess to engage in struggles for national liberation or struggles for their own safety.

Women’s participation is a key ingredient in achieving DDR goals as well as for sustainable societal balance in correcting the damage done to the social fabric of a country. Under the Security Council resolution 1325, measuring the advancement of women in all aspects of peace-building is crucial to DDR and other post conflict reconstruction activities. The caseload of Congo is a classic example where the role of women is instrumental in rebuilding the nation while serving as a real challenge. The degree of violation of women’s human rights is immense and ranges from physical abuse such as sexual harassment to contracting deadly diseases like HIV/ AIDS as a result where rebuilding their lives in a later achieved peace is also perplexing. The deep rooted family traditions and male dominated society hinders the possibility of addressing the special needs of women which prevents them from actively participating in DDR and other crisis prevention interventions. Therefore, moving the social lens from men towards women requires much effort on the ground.

UNDP’s survey in Congo to identify conflict affected women could be noteworthy as it has detected the subtle ways in which the issues can be solved. As an instance, the solidarity fund for agriculture to empower women was remarkable in combating unemployment due to lower skill level. The studies have shown that the women led families which are a result of losing their spouses in war were proven extremely weak in economic stability underlining that that women empowerment is decisive to DDR. Promotion of women’s rights by working to reconcile traditional values with progressive ideas will lead to improving the participation of women in society. Their vigorous involvement in early economic reconstruction activities also has the capacity to fight the social and economic marginalization of women. Local institutions and donors for Congo have experienced the creditable progress and the visibility of UNDP intervention. Increased economic and social opportunities while carefully considering local interpretations paves the way for a better future for women in confronting  social obstacles and fighting their own battles of a disturbed past. Their contribution to DDR matters in major and minor levels deciding its rate of success.

Women’s Role in DDR

By: Julia Rachiele

Women’s role in society is significantly overlooked in many aspects of life, and up until recently this included DDR processes.  DDR is a process that is to be integrated into society to be successful, specifically reintegration measures, to achieve this one can not undermine the power of women. Even if not playing an active role in combat, the capacity of women to influence conflict and post-conflict situations is an asset if utilized properly.  Women facilitate the functioning of roles and social systems in society, and it is only appropriate that this also applies to the success of DDR initiatives.

It is well known that women hold together the social structure of society including family bonds, social interaction, and community values.  This makes women an invaluable resource in upholding the goals of DDR.  Having acknowledged these two main points, they must be taken into consideration.  The need for DDR resources including psycho-social programs and economic programs specifically designed for women, and the ability to integrate women into overall DDR programming.  

Non combatant female roles and female dependents during conflict experience comparable trauma to men, however the manifestations and therefore the ways of coping differ greatly.  Female specific programs are a necessity in assisting women in overcoming the traumas of war even if they played passive roles.  Women who play passive support roles such as cooking, cleaning, and organizational roles are just as involved in conflict as men.  Similarly women and female child dependents of male combatants suffer hardships as well in living the life of being part of a combatant’s nuclear family.  As a result female specific mental health and medical attention need to be made gender specific through the utilization of specially trained counselors and doctors.

Women’s role in DDR goes farther than purely providing services to women.  DDR also includes integrating women in the DDR programs themselves, specifically, in community aspects.  As women are the protectors of social circles and have the responsibility of upholding families, they are valuable in upholding the goals of DDR as well.  Whether it is with women forming their own collectives in jumpstarting local economies, or being a fundamental stakeholder in protecting DDR successes, women are vital.  This is because women are able to enforce rules of DDR programs through mitigating the power that men hold.  They are able to structure society in such a way that women are able to stand in solidarity against what might be the desires of men to disrupt DDR successes.  While also ensuring that children and dependents are unable to sustain mentalities that may bring about new conflicts.

To underestimate the roles women play in society is not advisable in DDR planning.  Women are a vital and underacknowldged resource in post conflict society building.  Integrating women in DDR programs is a way to safeguard society in continuing successful reintegration processes and prevent a fall back into conflict.

A Gender Perspective in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

By: Lina Castellanos

Reintegration of ex-combatants is one of the main challenges in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration processes. Not only ex-combatants need to be given mechanisms for a sustainable reintegration, but they also need to have the determination to engage in what will be a complex long-term process. Still, one of the most relevant aspects in reintegration is the contribution and participation of society as a whole. Social Absorption –the ability of a community, economy and/or country to include ex-combatants as active full members of the society- is determinant when contemplating a sustainable reintegration. A national feeling of ownership of the process in which citizens are taken into account when planning and implementing DDR is crucial, but even more important is the ability of society to accept ex-combatants and participate in the absorption itself. The willingness to understand and accept that not all ex-combatants are the same, having in mind their live experiences, stories and roles in the past can contribute to planning and implementing accurate mechanisms for reintegration.  

The Second Generation of DDR caseloads were no longer exclusively military male (which was the case in the first generation). Women and children were now new actors within armed conflicts. However, their experiences, roles and needs are often under-represented. In the case of women, considering all as victims or simply supporters of male combatants is inaccurate. Women’s experiences and roles inside armed conflicts are numerous and diverse. It is clear that some women experienced sexual slavery, forced sterilization, abortion, the suppression of their femininity and other traumatizing consequences in the context of conflict. Yet, others committed crimes, had coordination responsibilities or for example, were given nursery roles. Not all women experienced the same, and not all fit in the stereotypical conception of women perceived as caring, protective and maternal; some of them actually don’t want to fit in those categories.

Understanding the complexity of individual experiences and expectations will enable a realistic absorption capacity. Considering women’s perspectives, opinions and needs in peace-building is fundamental for sustainable reintegration. Women have the ability of bringing communities together, rebuilding societies and fostering a culture of peace. In that sense, the inclusion of women in DDR is not only a duty but a benefit for society in general. Conditions that allow demobilized women to become productive members of their communities must be one of the main goals in reintegration processes because the failure to do so can jeopardize the whole DDR.

A gender perspective in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Lina Castellanos

Reintegration of ex-combatants is one of the main challenges in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration processes. Not only ex-combatants need to be given mechanisms for a sustainable reintegration, but they also need to have the determination to engage in what will be a complex long-term process. Still, one of the most relevant aspects in reintegration is the contribution and participation of society as a whole. Social Absorption –the ability of a community, economy and/or country to include ex-combatants as active full members of the society- is determinant when contemplating a sustainable reintegration. A national feeling of ownership of the process in which citizens are taken into account when planning and implementing DDR is crucial, but even more important is the ability of society to accept ex-combatants and participate in the absorption itself. The willingness to understand and accept that not all ex-combatants are the same, having in mind their live experiences, stories and roles in the past can contribute to planning and implementing accurate mechanisms for reintegration.

The Second Generation of DDR caseloads were no longer exclusively military male (which was the case in the first generation). Women and children were now new actors within armed conflicts. However, their experiences, roles and needs are often under-represented. In the case of women, considering all as victims or simply supporters of male combatants is inaccurate. Women’s experiences and roles inside armed conflicts are numerous and diverse. It is clear that some women experienced sexual slavery, forced sterilization, abortion, the suppression of their femininity and other traumatizing consequences in the context of conflict. Yet, others committed crimes, had coordination responsibilities or for example, were given nursery roles. Not all women experienced the same, and not all fit in the stereotypical conception of women perceived as caring, protective and maternal; some of them actually don’t want to fit in those categories.

Understanding the complexity of individual experiences and expectations will enable a realistic absorption capacity. Considering women’s perspectives, opinions and needs in peace-building is fundamental for sustainable reintegration. Women have the ability of bringing communities together, rebuilding societies and fostering a culture of peace. In that sense, the inclusion of women in DDR is not only a duty but a benefit for society in general. Conditions that allow demobilized women to become productive members of their communities must be one of the main goals in reintegration processes because the failure to do so can

 

 

SSR, Statebuilding and Why the Two Go Together in Haiti

Statebuilding is an endogenous political process where a nation-state looks to strengthen its capacity to provide security and justice, to improve its management of political affairs, and to better promote social and economic development. To do this, a state needs to focus on developing the state institutions necessary for it to effectively govern and protect its territorial boundaries.

At its core, statebuilding is also about the relationship that a state has with its society. A state has to demonstrate its political and public authority, by way of its institutional and organizational capacity, in order to maintain its legitimacy within its own society as well as among international stakeholders. The state-societal relationship is characterized by:

  • How power is distributed between the rich and the poor as well as the political processes that connects society and state;
  • the ability and response rate of the state in being able to fulfill its main responsibilities and to deliver services to its people; and
  • overall societal expectations and perceptions of what the state should be doing, how it should engage with society and whether society can express its demands and actually be heard (OECD 2011).

The goal of statebuilding therefore is to translate these three components into policy action. Given that “statebuilding is not a linear process, [and] securing physical control over a territory [is] necessary to create the conditions for building state capacity to deliver public goods, and accountability and responsiveness to a broader range of citizens,” SSR is fundamentally a statebuilding process (OECD 2011). SSR, as it has been conducted to date, has overemphasized the technical aspect of developing or bolstering security sector organizations  “rather than on the politics of creating states” (Jackson 2001). The result that this has produced are entities resembling states but absent of the legitimacy and authority to function as a state or to even be respected as such by the majority of their populations.

Another major challenge of recent SSR mandates is that these endeavors have been externally led rather than championed an “innately political process that should be conceptualized as an outgrowth of the wider political transition” (Sedra 2010). This troublesome reality has thereby contributed to observed failures of SSR attempts in places like Somalia, Iraq, Timor-Leste and Sierre Leone among others (Jackson 2011). In order for a country like Haiti to uphold the rule of law, ensure a balance of power between various societal stakeholders (so as to curtain their ability to undermine the state), protect the rights of its citizens, to foster economic development and to raise revenue in order to better deliver public services, Haiti has to be at the forefront of its own SSR processes while maintaining short-term international support.

In order to reinforce Haiti’s statehood by way of an improved security sector, the Haitian National Police (HNP) should be decentralized into departmental units. There is no country that readily comes to mind where a police force is tasked with securing an entire nation as opposed to securing several distinct cities and/or states within that nation. Haiti also needs to utilize SSR as a tool by which to better engage civil society actors so that there is a framework for sustained public participation within the security sector. Opportunities for important representative groups and the public at large to dialogue regularly in a safe and open environment can facilitate the emergence of community-led solutions to violence prevention and reduction as opposed to the fear-based and heavy handed approach that the HNP often resorts to in complex situations.

Ultimately, the Haitian government has to look at SSR as one of many necessary policy tools that will enable it to take a comprehensive approach in tackling the socioeconomic and wellbeing concerns of its people. The perpetual and unacceptable abject poverty that Haiti continues to struggle with is by far the country’s biggest security threat. To move from persistent crisis to a stable path of sustained development, social and economic security has to be approach in tandem.

Bangsamoro and DDR: Is it really going through DDR?

Submitted by: Llaura Garcia

One of the agreements in recent years that came about was the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro. The Bangsamoro, formerly known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was an insurgency group in Mindanao, Philippines (the southern part of the country). The engaged in terrorist activities with the goal of being independent from the Philippines. They wanted independence until 2011 when they decided to go for a substate status instead. While the idea of peace agreement is ideal, I do wonder if the entire process of DDR will be followed through or if it’s necessary. The agreement is essentially a ceasefire agreement but I don’t see them completely disarming, demobilizing, or reintegrating. The agreement does have elements of DDR but not to the same extent as other DDR operations.

The Bangsmoro agreement was about the Bangsmoro having a way to govern themselves. Essentially, the agreement has a similar relationship to the central government that the US states has with the federal government. What I find fascinating about this agreement is that it is about the expansion of the powers by Bangsamoro. For example, it is stated in section 3.6 that, “the customary rights and traditions of indigenous peoples shall be taken into consideration in the formation of the Bansmoro’s justice system.” The Bangsmoro, who were guilty of terrorist acts, will not only get to be a substate –but will have the opportunity to create their own laws, govern themselves, have the power to levy taxes, get grants from outside institutions or organizations, generating their own revenue, and could expand their territory should certain areas decide to be included in the agreement. While this agreement is certainly more preferable to war and other terrorist acts, (as an outside observer), it is difficult to see how the people would be willing to live with the result of the agreement and normalize the relationship with those involved.

According to the Bangsmoro agreement (Section 8), the parties involved will participate in normalizing the relationship of those involved to ensure human security, maintain human rights, the MILF themselves are in charge of their own “demobilization” while the functions of the AFP to police will be transferred to the Bangsmoro, disbandment of private armies, reduction and control of firearms, rehabilitate ex-combatants, considering the needs of the IDPs, and creating a transitional justice system to address grievances. While I find that peace will always be my choice to fighting, the peace agreement doesn’t seem to be the most peaceful agreement since the group are in charge of their own demobilization, they can generate their own revenue, and there’s very minimal talk about oversite to ensure that the process is moving forward. I like the idea of Filipinos not fighting against each other but it worries me that loopholes will be found and some of the generated revenue will go to the “demobilized” or disenfranchised men who sympathizes or has relations with terrorist organizations like Abu Sayyaf and Al Qaida.

VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND THE RE-SHAPING OF PEACE OPERATIONS: DDR, CVE AND THE NEED FOR NEW POLICY GUIDANCE.

United Nations (UN) peace efforts, and particularly peace operations, are often reviewed according their ability to adapt to ever changing contexts. The latter is reflected in two particular aspects: how should the UN engage in a particular peace mission or operations; how should the UN guide its transition processes during peace operations and missions. Both these questions are linked to the aspects of planning and the tools and frameworks the UN’s Security Council is taking into account when developing peace missions mandates.
Considering the above mentioned, currently Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programming is facing the challenge of adapting to the context of combating and/or countering violent extremism. This is particularly challenging as DDR as a political strategy for post-conflict management is now being planned to start operating in contexts in which military operations are ongoing and the prospects for achieving peace remain unclear, signifying a complete change from traditional and second generation DDR approaches. In these sense, DDR is challenged by the question of whether it can help demobilize and disengage combatants. How DDR ought to be planned in such context, and how will this political strategy adapt for it to be able to still deliver to its objectives? Do DDR benchmarks also need to change?
I argue that DDR must consider the following in order to quickly adapt is role in peace operations and keep its effectiveness for contributing to conflict management: a) It needs to be both flexible in terms of adapting to local contexts but should not lack the consideration of reformed and updated peace frameworks; b) planning for DDR mandates by the Security Council must be done taking into account the current fragmented programming issues that the United Nations is facing; c) to ensure that the DDR strategy responds to local needs, as well as to reduce coordination and collaboration issues among implementing actors (UN actors, local governments, non-government organizations and communities) DDR planning should fundamentally be on-field focused and people-oriented.
Regarding how DDR will or should adapt to new contexts of violent extremism, I believe one key aspect is benchmarking. Benchmarking implies that DDR will be clearly planned, thus avoiding undertaking mandates that are loose in frameworks and policy guidance; benchmarking DDR would then respond to the particularities of the context and would help guide DDR when lacking a peace framework and pre-conditions.
Additionally, aspects related to sequencing and expansions of caseloads are two key elements to consider when trying to keep DDR as a strategy in contexts facing violent extremism. On the first hand, if DD is less possible, then focusing on reintegration of victims or vulnerable populations is one step to prevent mobilization or engagement as well as to advance on efforts regarding helping communities to develop absorption capabilities. This is just one particular example.
DDR is a relevant tool for peace, thus starting to think how to reach a third generation DDR and combine it with all the UN peace transformations to make it context-responsive is an urgent and current step.

Exploring the DDR and SSR Nexus in State Building

In order to promote post-conflict peace through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in war afflicted countries, there has to be security. Primarily, affected countries have to guarantee minimum assurances of security in order for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the very premise of which DDR efforts are built off of, to be upheld – let alone enforced. Understanding the role of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in post-conflict settings therefore becomes just as important as the implementation of DDR itself, especially given the role of divergent political interests, institutional deficiencies and the resulting lawlessness that provokes insecurity in the first place. DDR and SSR are inherently political activities that greatly impact a nation’s sovereignty as well as its capacity not only in executing these approaches but to ultimately lead its people through improved governance. For this reason, a substantive understanding and evaluation of what is often termed ‘the DDR and SSR nexus’ is critical to not only guiding a country’s post-conflict recovery process but to also promoting its long-term national development.

To be clear, both DDR and SSR are necessary to obtaining lasting peace as a country looks to overcome its war induced atrocities and move towards its long-term national development. At the same time, the conceptual linkage between DDR and SSR has been more readily observed than the implementation of an actual coordinated approach to the two processes have been in practice DDR is committed to advancing peace and security in post-conflict environments through recovery initiatives such as addressing the individual wellbeing of ex-combatants and affected communities in a manner that arguably fosters a sense of nation building among a war-affected populace. SSR on the other hand is more so concerned with peace building by strengthening state institutions themselves as a way of further protecting said populations.

Notwithstanding this reality, the conceptual linkage between the two processes has been more apparent than an actual achievement of a coordinated approach to implementing the two in practice. This largely has to do with the fact that DDR has had a more substantive history with UN engagement while SSR is a more recent endeavor as a complementary component to, as well as extension of, DDR efforts that seeks to maintain lasting peace beyond the conflict incident itself. The UN has recently posited however that a failure to approach DDR and SSR in concert with one another can unintentionally serve to completely undermine overall security efforts.

As a result, I am interested in conducting a case study analysis of Liberia and Haiti in terms of their utility of both DDR and SSR. Liberia employed DDR and SSR under a democratically elected president who maintained popular support in Liberia’s post-war setting. This context is an interesting one within which to explore United Nations Mission in Liberia’s (UNMIL) endeavor to achieve stability and lasting peace.

Haiti is also of interest because the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, known by its French acronym MINUSTAH, was initiated in 2004 without the necessary pre-DDR conditions that would typically be required for this approach. Additionally, MINUSTAH attempted to employ DDR alongside ongoing SSR efforts while Haiti was under a transitional government. The reality that the UN did not pursue Haiti in DDR after the first coup d’etat towards Aristide in 1991, most likely because the situation did not meet typical DDR requirements, provides an interesting backdrop for why DDR was the method of choice after his second coup d’etat. Evaluating the implications that this had on state building, given Haiti’s turbulent post-dictatorship political history, may speak to the political context necessary for an integrated DDR/SSR approach to be effective.

The Economic Incentives of ISIS: A Roadblock for Future DDR Programs

The Economic Incentives of ISIS: A Roadblock for Future DDR Programs

By Colby Silver

The economic aspects of armed conflict and their relation to successful DDR should not, and cannot, be ignored. This issue has become particularly relevant with the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The Atlantic recently quoted a man in southern Syria as saying, “ISIS controls every detail of the economy. Only their people or those who swear allegiance to them have a good life.”[1] The man goes on to tell how when ISIS arrived in his hometown the militants took complete control of the local economy, looted, confiscated property, and took over local business networks. In other parts of Syria ISIS controls trading routes, imposes heavy taxes on utilities like water and electricity, and controls the prices of consumer goods.[2] What ISIS has done is construct a lawless war economy, designed with the sole purpose of funding itself and providing economic incentives to its militants.

As the article points out, many of ISIS’s economic tactics are being used to compel locals to join the extremist group. Looking forward, there is the threat that this illicit economic system will become entrenched in the region, creating a system of profit for IS combatants that will make membership in the movement appealing, or even necessary out of economic necessity. This situation will provide a challenge to any future attempted DDR programs that will have to take into careful consideration the economic incentives of IS combatants. The destruction caused by the wars in Syria and Iraq and the spread of the Islamic State have decimated local economies, leaving the war economy as the only realistic source of livelihood.

Although it is difficult to envisage any form of DDR program targeting ISIS at this point in time, any potential program in the future will need to look carefully at the economic incentives of ISIS’s “Caliphate” and consider what needs to be undertaken to provide equal or greater economic incentives within a stable, licit economy.

It is interesting to consider foreign fighters in an economic context as well. It is widely agreed that foreign fighters have migrated in large numbers to join ISIS over the past two years due to a combination of radicalization perhaps catalyzed in part by disenfranchisement at home, leaving one to consider whether more economic opportunities at home would discourage any kind of susceptibility to ISIS’s propaganda. It is hard to say. Due to the violence of the Islamic State and the apparent power of its ideology and propaganda, undertaking DDR would be a daunting task and the program would no doubt have to occur on many different levels, tailored to the experiences and needs of various different groups of combatants and non-combatants involved with the group. However, one likely universal incentive for either sustained conflict or peace is which life offers better economic opportunities,  life as an IS member/combatant or a life as a civilian in a failed state. At the moment, the economic incentives of IS seem to be considerably stronger.

[1] Joanna Paraszcuk, “The ISIS Economy: Crushing Taxes and High Unemployment: how the Islamic State uses economic persecution as a recruitment tactic,” The Atlantic, September 2015. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/isis-territory-taxes-recruitment-syria/403426/.

[2] Ibid.

Can South Sudan learn from DDR failures in Liberia?

The situation in South Sudan is complex at best. In this regard, it is equally challenging to get one’s head around what a successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program would look like at this time. Moreover, it seems unclear how new negotiated DDR initiatives would build on previous plans set out in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement[1] (CPA). Perhaps there are lessons to be learned from other countries in the region?

South Sudan’s secession in July 2011 ended the CPA period and thus the legal imperative to undertake the DDR mandated therein. Budget constraints and disagreement between the government and donors over the objectives and modalities of further halted the program. When South Sudan plunged into civil war in December 2013, following less than two years of independence, the situation was further complicated. The current conflict has been one of intense and brutal violence, much of which has targeted civilians merely for their ethnicity or perceived political violence. Women have been systematically abducted and abused. Sexual violence perpetrated by both government forces and rebels, is rampant.

Following numerous broken ceasefires between the fighting factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) brokered peace agreement was signed on August 26th, 2015 between President Salva Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar. While the 70-page agreement includes a few clauses on cantonment and DDR, the latter is not discussed at length. But with persisting fighting, any prospect of a new robust and sustainable DDR program seems implausible and, to be frank, rather farfetched. Furthermore, the SPLA has grown in size due to continued recruitment and the absorption of rebel militia groups that has exceeded the DDR caseload.

However, while the situation remains volatile, South Sudan has an opportunity to learn from past mistakes within its own DDR programs as well as from countries in the region, Liberia being one. While the DDR program in Liberia often has been cited as a success or at least a semi-success, there were several issues that could be used as “lessons learned” and shape recommendations for a future program in South Sudan, including but not limited to:

  1. Inadequate screening processes during the disarmament process contributed to a bloated caseload, which presented problems for the subsequent reintegration phase. Recommendation: Ensure adequate screening processes while paying special attention to inclusion, especially of women and children.
  2. To enter a cantonment site, one had to be on a list drawn up by the combatants’ local commander. This gave too much decision-making power to commanders. Recommendation: In order to break command structures, alternative mechanisms have to be put in place for monitoring who is a combatant.
  3. Failure to demobilize and reintegrate women because of labeling them as Women Associated with Armed Groups (WAAG) to prevent them from entering the program through the official DDR channel. Recommendation: Ensure that design and implementation of gender-specific reinsertion and reintegration measures are informed by situation-based, on-the-ground analysis to asses the special needs of women, active combatants and those identified as WAAGs
  4. Cantonment sites did not have adequate facilities for female ex-combatants. Recommendation: Ensure cantonment sites have facilities for women, and ensure security within the sites.
  5. Achieving successful reintegration and sustainable employment was a huge challenge. Recommendation: Follow the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), which suggest community-based reintegration with dual targeting, i.e. community members and ex-combatants with a similar profile should be targeted together to re-establish livelihoods.

[1] The CPA in 2005 was brokered between the dominant Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) factions and the National Congress Party (NCP), the ruling party of Sudan. The agreement stipulated the 2011 referendum that led to South Sudan’s secession.